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COMMENT
Saying "Neigh" to North Carolina's Equine Activity Liability Act
I. OVERVIEW
Forty-four states have enacted equine activity liability statutes that
grant qualified immunity from civil liability to certain classes of per-
sons who are engaged in equine activities.' Why are these statutes so
popular? One reason may be the impact of the horse industry on the
national economy and the American quality of life.
According to the American Horse Council (AHC), the national
trade association for the horse industry in Washington, D.C., there are
almost seven million commercial and recreational horses in the
United States.2 Seventy-two percent are used for horseshows and
other recreational activities.3 Eleven percent are used for racing or
breeding.4 Over seven million Americans are involved in the horse
industry, and almost two million Americans own horses.5
The economic and social impact of the horse industry is staggering
to those unfamiliar with the industry. The AHC estimates that the
horse industry contributes over twenty-five billion dollars in goods
and services, and has a total impact of $112.1 billion on the gross do-
mestic product.6 The contribution to the gross domestic product is
greater than the motion picture, railroad transportation, and tobacco
industries, respectively.7
1. Washington enacted the first statute in 1989. Terence J. Centner, The New Equine Lia-
bility Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997, 999-1000 (1995). The following states have similar statutes:
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
Statistics on equine activity liability statutes in other jurisdictions are based on generalizations
of the statutes, with the focus on non-inherent risk provisions. See infra Part II(A) for an expla-
nation of non-inherent risks. Statistics do not include West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming
because the statutes are so different from North Carolina's Equine Activity Liability Act.
2. American Horse Council, Horse Industry Statistics, at http://www.horsecouncil.org/ahc-
stats.html (last visited May 8, 2000).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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North Carolina joined thirty-seven other states in enacting equine
activity liability statutes in 1997.8 The statutes became effective on
January 1, 1998.9 There have been no appellate cases brought under
the statutes in the few years that they have been in effect. Therefore,
this paper will examine the statutes, including the history and purpose
of the legislation. This paper will then analyze the effectiveness of the
legislation and policy considerations that arise out of the legislation.
II. LEGISLATION
A. The Equine Activity Liability Act
The Equine Activity Liability Act. North Carolina's Equine Activ-
ity Liability Act (EALA) identifies equines as horses, ponies, mules, 0
donkeys and hinnies.11 The EALA is composed of three statutes.
Section 99E-1 provides definitions of terms used in the EALA."2 Sec-
tion 99E-2 addresses the liability of equine sponsors, professionals and
other persons engaged in equine activities.13 Finally, section 99E-3
imposes duties upon equine professionals and sponsors to warn per-
sons engaged in equine activities that equine professionals and spon-
sors are not liable for injuries or deaths resulting exclusively from the
inherent risks of equine activities.14 This paper will discuss the EALA
by topic, rather than by statute.
Persons engaged in equine activities not liable. An equine activity
sponsor, professional or any other person 5 engaged in an equine ac-
tivity is not liable for the injury or death of a participant as a result of
the inherent risks of equine activities. 6 A sponsor is a person who
sponsors, organizes or provides facilities for equine activities. 7 A
sponsor may be an individual, group, club, partnership, corporation,
operator or promoter of equine facilities. 8 The equine activity may
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-1 to -3 (1999).
9. Act of Aug. 6, 1997, ch. 376, sec. 1, 1997, N.C. Sess. Laws 962.
10. A mule is a half-ass, or, as compared to a hinny, a cross between a mare (female horse)
and a jackass (male donkey). See infra text accompanying note 11. The American Council of
Spotted Asses, Inc. (ACOSA), is dedicated to promoting and preserving the spotted ass (donkey
and burro) and half-ass (mule and hinny). The American Council of Spotted Asses, at http://
www.spottedass.com (last modified Nov. 3, 1999).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(2) (1999). Some states, such as Colorado and New Mexico,
include dromedaries such as llamas and alpacas. A hinny is a half-ass, or, as compared to a mule,
a cross between a jennet (female donkey) and a stallion (male horse). See supra note 10.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1 (1999).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2 (1999).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3 (1999).
15. This paper will refer to persons in this group as "sponsors" or "defendants."
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(a) (1999).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(4) (1999).
18. Id.
2001]
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be for profit or not for profit. 9 A professional is a person who re-
ceives compensation for: 1) instructing a participant; 2) renting
equines for riding, driving or being a passenger; 3) renting equipment
or tack to a participant; 4) examining or giving medical treatment to
equines; or 5) shoeing or trimming hooves of equines.20 Finally, a per-
son is "engaged in an equine activity" when they participate in or as-
sist a participant or a sponsor in an equine activity.2 This does not
include spectators, unless the spectator places her or himself in an un-
authorized area in immediate proximity to the equine activity.22
Participants. A participant is a person who is engaged in an equine
activity.23 A participant may be an amateur or a professional.24 The
EALA applies whether the participant paid or did not pay to partici-
pate in the equine activity.25
North Carolina courts may have to determine whether participants
are immune from actions brought by other participants. A sponsor,
professional or "any other person" engaged in an equine activity is not
liable for injuries to a participant that result from the inherent risks of
equine activities.26 Although the EALA provides that "any other per-
son" includes corporations and partnerships,27 it does not otherwise
define this protected class. Therefore, participants may be immune
from liability if they are considered "any other person" under the
EALA.
Louisiana courts have considered this issue. In Gautreau v. Wash-
ington,28 the defendant and plaintiff were participants in a horse show.
The entrance to the horse arena was crowded, so they waited in a less
crowded area away from the entrance. When a passing horse brushed
the defendant's stallion, the stallion reared and kicked the plaintiff in
the hip. The court held that the defendant was "any other person"
under the EALA,29 and was therefore immune from liability for inju-
ries to the plaintiff.30 North Carolina courts may face a similar issue.
19. Id.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(5) (1999).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(1) (1999).
22. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(7) (1999).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(a) (1999).
27. Id.
28. Gautreau v. Washington, 672 So. 2d 262 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.1(B) (West 1999).
30. Gautreau, 672 So. 2d at 266. A telecommunications company is apparently not "any
other person" for the purposes of claiming immunity under the statute. Nielson v. AT & T
Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434 (S.D. 1999) (applying principle of ejusdem generis to determine that
telecommunications company was not "any other person" under South Dakota Equine Activi-
ties Act and therefore not immune from liability for death of rider whose horse tripped in cable
trench).
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Engage in equine activities. The EALA defines "engage in an
equine activity" as participating or assisting a participant, sponsor or
professional in an equine activity.3 "Equine activity" is defined as
"any activity involving equines. 32 Unlike the definitions in most
EALAs, North Carolina's definition of equine activity is so broad that
it includes recreational equine activities.33
Inherent risks of equine activities. No participant or representative
may bring an action against or recover from an equine activity spon-
sor, professional or any other person engaged in an equine activity for
injury, damage or death resulting exclusively34 from the inherent risks
of equine activities.35 This provision grants qualified immunity36 to
sponsors, professionals and persons engaged in equine activities.
"Inherent risks of equine activities" are dangers or conditions that
are integral parts of equine activities.37 These risks include the possi-
bility that equine behavior will cause injury or death to persons
around them.3" They also include the unpredictability of equine reac-
tions to sounds, sudden movements, unfamiliar objects, persons or
other animals.39
Non-inherent risks. The EALA identifies several acts, omissions or
occurrences that: 1) are not inherent risks of equine activity; or 2) do
not limit or prevent liability for the injury, damage or death of a par-
ticipant. Because the EALA protects sponsors from liability for inju-
ries caused by the inherent risks of equine activities, all acts, omissions
or occurrences that are not protected by the EALA will be referred to
as "non-inherent risks."
Section 99E-1(6)(b) provides that accidents involving motor vehi-
cles are non-inherent risks.40 Section 99E-2(b) identifies four addi-
tional acts or omissions that are non-inherent risks. 41 First, a sponsor
may be liable if he or she provides faulty tack or equipment,42 the
sponsor either knew or should have known that the equipment or tack
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(1) (1999).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(3) (1999).
33. Carl v. Resnick, 714 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999) (citing Krystyna M. Carmel, The
Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Discussion of Those in Existence and Suggestions for a Model
Act, 83 Ky. L.J. 157, 177 (1995) (Connecticut, Wisconsin and Wyoming are "recreation states"
that include recreational horseback riding in their EALAs)).
34. Most EALAs do not include "exclusively."
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(a) (1999).
36. Early versions of the bill included "qualified immunity" in the purpose and findings, but
the language was dropped after numerous revisions.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(6) (1999).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(6)(a) (1999).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-1(6)(b) (1999).
40. Id.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b) (1999).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(1) (1999).
2001]
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol24/iss1/7
160 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:156
was faulty,"3 and the faulty equipment or tack was the proximate
cause of the injury, damage or death." Second, a sponsor may be
liable if he or she provides an equine to the participant without mak-
ing reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the par-
ticipant to safely engage in the activity or safely manage the equine."5
Third, a sponsor may be liable for the willful or wanton disregard for
the participant's safety."6 Willful or wanton disregard may be an act
or an omission.47 The act or omission must be the proximate cause of
the injury, damage or death. 8 Fourth, a sponsor or professional may
be liable for negligent acts or omissions that proximately cause the
injury, damage or death of the participant."9 Finally, section 99E-2(c)
provides that the EALA does not limit or prevent liability under
products liability law.5°
Warning requirement. Sponsors must post and maintain warning
signs and include warnings in all written contracts51 to be protected by
the EALA.52 The warning, designed by the Department of Agricul-
ture and Consumer Services, 53 must state: "WARNING[:] under
North Carolina law, an equine activity sponsor or equine professional
is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant in equine
activities resulting exclusively from the inherent risks of equine activi-
ties. Chapter 99E of the North Carolina General Statutes."5" This
warning must be posted in a clearly visible location on or near the
stable, corral, arena or area in which the equine activity occurs.55 The
writing on the sign must be in black letters at least one inch in
height.56 The warning in the contract must be clearly printed.57
B. Legislative History
Unlike other states, North Carolina's EALA does not include a
statement of the legislative purpose and findings. 51 This makes it diffi-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(2) (1999).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(3) (1999).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(4) (1999).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(c) (1999).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3(a) (1999).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3(c) (1999).
53. The bill was amended to add Consumer Services.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3(b) (1999).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3(a).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-11-1 (1999) (legislative intent and findings); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:15-1 (West 1999) (legislative findings and declarations); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-13-2
5
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cult to determine legislative intent when interpreting the statute. An
examination of the amendments to the first EALA bill may help iden-
tify the purpose for this legislation.
The first equine activities bill appears to have been introduced into
the North Carolina House of Representatives in early 1995 as "A Bill
to Be Entitled 'An Act to Provide Immunity from Liability for Equine
Activities.' , 59 This bill included a section that identified the purpose
and findings of the General Assembly.6" The General Assembly con-
cluded that: 1) equine activities are risky and may result in injuries; 2)
equine activities provide numerous personal and economic benefits to
citizens; 3) equine activities preserve public peace, health and safety;
and 4) the General Assembly intended to encourage equine activities
by limiting civil liability of persons involved in equine activities.6 The
Chairman of the House Judiciary I Committee removed this bill from
the calendar because of its "complexity" and appointed a subcommit-
tee to study the bill.62
House Bill 176, the bill that the General Assembly eventually rati-
fied,63 was introduced almost two years later and was referred to the
House Judiciary II Committee.' The bill was entitled, "An Act to
Clarify Responsibilities for Equine Activities and to Provide Qualified
Immunity from Liability. '65 The bill contained the same purpose and
findings as the original House Bill.66 However, the purpose and find-
ings were not included in the Committee Substitute. There are, how-
ever, other legislative documents that might help identify the purpose
of the EALA.
Visitor registration sheets in the Committee Meeting Minutes indi-
cate that representatives from the North Carolina Department of Ag-
riculture State Fair Horse Complex, the North Carolina Horse
Council, and several local farms and stables, among other groups, at-
tended the House Judiciary II Committee meetings.67 The North Car-
(Michie 1999) (legislative purpose and findings); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-101 (1999) (legisla-
tive findings and intent).
59. H. 61-BILL 2, Judiciary I Committee Substitute Favorable 03/15/95, Session 1995 (N.C.
1995).
60. Id. at 1, lines 9-17.
61. Id.
62. HOUSE JUDICIARY I COMMITTEE MINUTES, April 6, 1995 (N.C. 1995). A similar bill was
introduced in the Senate on May 2, 1995 and referred to the Judiciary I Committee, but was not
ratified.
63. Act of Aug. 6, 1997, ch. 376, sec. 1, 1997, N.C. Sess. Laws 962.
64. H. 176-BILL 1, Judiciary II Committee, Session 1997 (N.C. 1997).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1, lines 9-17. See supra note 60.
67. HOUSE JUDICIARY II VISITOR REGISTRATION SHEET, March 11, 1997 (N.C. 1997). Leg-
islative history from 1974 to date is available in the North Carolina General Assembly Legisla-
tive Library in the State Legislative Building, 300 North Salisbury Street, Raleigh, North
2001]
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olina Horse Council (NCHC) presented statistics on the impact of the
horse industry at the national68 and state levels. According to the
NCHC, there were 26,300 horse farms in North Carolina in 1996, with
an average of five horses per farm.69 The total value of horses in the
state was $533 million.
James A. Graham, the Commissioner of the North Carolina De-
partment of Agriculture, also stressed the importance of the horse in-
dustry in the state in a memorandum to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.7 ° According to Commissioner Graham, the bill was im-
portant for the continuing growth of the horse industry in North Caro-
lina.71 The state operated two major horse show facilities in 1997 and
was scheduled to open two more. These facilities were competing
with other states in booking major horse events.72 Commissioner
Graham was concerned that, unlike thirty-seven states at the time,
North Carolina would be at a disadvantage because it did not have an
EALA to protect sponsors.73 The EALA would allow managers to
book the horse shows and events needed to collect revenues on which
they so heavily depend.74
In a second memorandum to the Senate Judiciary Committee three
weeks later, the Commissioner identified other benefits of equine ac-
tivities: preserving open spaces and generating income for grain and
forage production.75 North Carolina Department of Agriculture sta-
tistics from the memorandum provide additional support. In 1997,
there were 132,000 horses76 on 446,000 acres of land.77 Approxi-
Carolina 27603-5926. The library is also accessible online at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/
LegLibrary.html.
68. The national statistics were taken from the survey used by the American Horse Council.
See supra notes 2-7.
69. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE MINUTES, June 24, 1997 (N.C. 1997). Statistics were
based on a limited 1996 survey by the North Carolina Department of Agriculture.
70. Memorandum from James A. Graham, Commissioner, North Carolina Department of
Agriculture, to Senate Judiciary Committee I (June 18, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina
General Assembly Legislative Library).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Connecticut also cited this as a reason for enacting its EALA, though one author
doubts the validity of the reason. Sharlene A. McEvoy, The Rise of Equine Activity Liability
Acts, 3 ANIMAL L. 201, 214-15 (1975).
74. Memorandum from James A. Graham, Commissioner, North Carolina Department of
Agriculture, to Senate Judiciary Committee I (June 18, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina
General Assembly Legislative Library).
75. Id.
76. North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 1996 North Caro-
lina Equine Survey: Equine Inventory and Value by County, at http://www.ncagr.com/stats/
equine/eqinvc.htm (last modified Apr. 25, 1997).
77. North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 1996 North Caro-
lina Equine Survey: Narrative, at http://www.ncagr.com/stats/equine/equine.htm (last modified
Apr. 25, 1997).
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mately 5900 horse operations had six or more horses, and approxi-
mately 600 operations had more than twenty-five horses.78 Although
there is no way to determine the exact legislative purpose and find-
ings, it is clear that the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and
the NCHC were the major driving forces behind this legislation.
After the General Assembly ratified House Bill 176, the president
of the NCHC told the Greensboro News & Record that the group
sought protection from liability to reduce the cost of liability insur-
ance.79 The group feared a rise in the cost of equine insurance be-
cause of claims by persons injured in equine activities.8 0 This
explanation is supported by bill drafts of the Roller Skating Rink
Safety and Liability Act (Roller Skating Rink Act), a qualified immu-
nity statute that was ratified with the EALA.8 t
The original bill of the Roller Skating Rink Act included the Gen-
eral Assembly's purpose and findings.8 2 One of these findings was
that liability insurance was expensive and hard to maintain.83 Insur-
ance premiums increased as the number of insurance providers who
were willing to provide insurance to roller skating rink operators de-
creased.8 4 Most roller skating rinks in North Carolina were run by
small, independent businesses that could not afford increasing liability
premiums. 8" The inability to obtain liability insurance adversely af-
fected operators and injured skaters.86 Consequently, the General
Assembly ratified the Roller Skating Rink Act to grant qualified im-
munity to operators who complied with the duties set out in the
statute.8 7
Other states have cited the high cost of liability insurance as a justi-
fication for granting qualified immunity to sponsors. The Michigan
Court of Appeals found in a 1999 decision that at least one-third of
Michigan's public stables closed in the 1990s because of rising insur-
78. North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 1996 North Caro-
lina Equine Survey: Number of Equine Operations, by Size, at http://www.ncagr.com/stats/
equine/eqopsz.htm (last modified Apr. 25, 1997).
79. Horse Intereste Seek Lawsuit Shield, GREENSBORO NEWS AND RECORD, July 28, 1997, at
B2.
80. Id.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-10 to -14 (1999).
82. H. 789-BILL 1, Judiciary I Committee, Session 1995 (N.C. 1995).
83. Id. at 1, lines 19-20.
84. Id. at 1, lines 21-23.
85. Id. at 2, lines 1-3.
86. Id. at 2, lines 4-6.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-14 (1999). Roller skaters and spectators are deemed to have
knowledge of and assume the "inherent risks" of roller skating that are not caused by the opera-
tor's breach of duties under North Carolina General Statutes section 99E-13. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 99E-11 (1999), for a list of operators' duties and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-12 (1999), for
roller skaters' duties.
2001]
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ance premiums and the costs of maintaining horses. 88 The Detroit
Free Press reported in 1993 that insurance carriers stopped writing
policies from 1985 to 1988 for persons who rented horses.8 9 The
Michigan Horse Council lobbied to have the Michigan Legislature
promulgate legislation that would protect commercial stable operators
from civil liability.90 The lobby was successful, and Michigan's EALA
became effective on March 30, 1995. 9t
The theory that North Carolina's General Assembly may have
promulgated the EALA to protect businesspersons engaged in equine
activities from the high cost of liability insurance is also supported by
statistics on horseback-related injuries. There were 339,462 horse-
back-related injuries in the United States between 1992 and 1996.92
Fractures accounted for over twenty-nine percent of these injuries. 93
In 1996, approximately eighteen percent of all injuries were head inju-
ries.94 Forty-three percent of injuries between 1992 and 1996 were
suffered by persons under twenty-five years of age.95 The severity and
frequency of horseback-related injuries may have contributed to the
high cost of liability insurance, and in some cases, caused insurance
companies to refuse coverage for some equine activities. 96
Another factor that has caused liability insurance to increase in
other states is the change in negligence law over the last few de-
cades.97 Almost all states are now comparative negligence states.
This allows more injured persons to recover because contributorily
negligence is not a complete bar to recovery. The effect on equine
sponsors is that contributorily negligent participants may recover in
comparative negligence states with EALAs that do not include simple
negligence as an inherent risk of equine activity.
North Carolina, however, is one of the few remaining contributory
negligence states.98 Although simple negligence is a non-inherent risk
under North Carolina's EALA,9 9 a contributorily negligent partici-
88. Amburgey v. Sauder, 605 N.W.2d 84, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Act of Dec. 29, 1994, No. 351, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts §§ 1-7 (enacting Equine Activity
Liability Act).
92. NEISS 1997 Horse Related Injuries, 7 AM. MED. EQUESTRIAN Ass'N NEWS 2 (Aug.
1997), at http://www.law.utexas.edui/dawson/amea/aug97nws.htm#neiss.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. E-mail from Evan Beauchamp, Vice President, Equine Insurance Specialists, to Karen
A. Blum, author (May 9, 2000) (on file with author).
97. Terence J. Centner, The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REv. 997, 998-99
(1995).
98. The other states are Alabama, Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(4) (1999).
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pant will be barred from recovery if the defendant successfully raises
contributory negligence as a defense. Thus, the recent change in neg-
ligence law should not cause the cost of equine liability insurance to
increase in North Carolina.
Does North Carolina's EALA protect sponsors from liability? If
so, to what extent? If the high cost of liability insurance is a major
reason for protecting equine sponsors, how effective is the EALA in
reducing the number of insurance claims and the cost of liability
insurance?
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
EQUINE ACTIVITY LIABILITY ACT
Does North Carolina's EALA protect sponsors from liability to
which they would be exposed in the absence of the EALA? The
EALA grants sponsors immunity, but limits immunity by identifying
non-inherent risks that render the EALA inapplicable. Therefore,
immunity depends on the scope of the non-inherent risks.
A. Limitations to the General Rule of No Liability: Non-Inherent
Risks
1. Negligence
North Carolina's EALA provides that negligence does not prevent
or limit the liability of a sponsor.100 The negligence must be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, damage or death.1"1 EALAs that identify
negligence as a non-inherent risk severely limit the immunity that the
EALAs purport to afford sponsors. At least eighteen states have
EALAs with such provisions.1 2 Half of these states also identify will-
ful or wanton conduct and intentional acts or omissions as non-inher-
ent risks.10 3 In these states, EALAs offer little or no protection to
sponsors because there is very little tortious conduct that is not negli-
gent, willful or wanton or intentional.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. These states are Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Utah, Vermont and Virginia.
103. These states are Arizona, Hawaii, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Utah. Kentucky and Minnesota, like North Carolina, do not limit liability for
negligent or willful or wanton acts, but are silent as to intentional acts. Maine, New Jersey and
Virginia do not limit liability for negligent or intentional acts, but are silent as to willful or
wanton acts. Connecticut, Michigan and Vermont do not limit liability for negligence.
2001]
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Twenty-three states have EALAs that are silent as to simple negli-
gence as an inherent risk. 0 4 Two states expressly identify gross negli-
gence as a non-inherent risk.10 5 Presumably, these states afford
immunity to negligent sponsors. There are no appellate cases that ex-
pressly state that a negligent defendant is immune where the defen-
dant's conduct does not fall into any category of non-inherent risk.
However, the Arizona Court of Appeals in dictum suggested that this
would be the case.
In Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc. ,106 a ten-year-old girl was injured
while leading a horse out of a corral. The plaintiff sued based on neg-
ligent supervision. The Arizona EALA provides that an equine
owner who allows another to take control of an equine is not liable for
injuries if the person signed a release." 7 The EALA does not apply
to equine owners who are grossly negligent or who commit willful,
wanton or intentional acts or omissions.'0 8 The court held that the
EALA did not shield the defendant from liability because the injury
occurred during a non-riding activity.'0 9 In reaching this conclusion,
the court examined legislative materials, including committee meeting
minutes, to determine legislative intent. In a footnote, the court noted
that a committee chairman inaccurately stated, "If it can be proven
that an owner or agent was negligent, that person can still be lia-
ble."' 10 This suggests that, in Arizona and states with EALAs that are
silent about negligence as a non-inherent risk, a defendant who is
merely negligent may be immune from liability where the defendant
would otherwise be liable. The significance of negligence as a non-
inherent risk will be discussed later in this section.
2. Faulty Equipment and Tack
North Carolina's EALA provides that liability is not limited or pre-
vented when a sponsor provides faulty equipment or tack and the
sponsor knew or should have known the equipment or tack was
104. The states that are silent as to negligence are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas and Washington. Every EALA that includes negligence as an inherent risk limits immu-
nity by expressly excluding as a non-inherent risk intentional and willful or wanton acts or omis-
sions. In other words, EALAs that protect negligent sponsors do not protect sponsors from
exposure to liability for intentional acts or omissions, nor for willful and wanton disregard for a
participant's safety.
105. The states that do not limit liability for gross negligence are Arizona and Hawaii.
106. Bothel v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 965 P.2d 47 (Ariz. 1998).
107. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-553(A)(2) (West 1999).
108. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-553(D)(2) (West 1999).
109. Bothell, 965 P.2d at 54.
110. Id. at 53 n.8.
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faulty.111 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
knew or should have known that the tack was faulty, and that the
faulty equipment or tack proximately caused that injury, damage or
death.' 1 2 The combination of this provision with other EALA non-
inherent risk provisions renders the tack and equipment exception vir-
tually useless. Because there have been so few cases brought under
EALAs nationwide, a few hypothetical situations will help illustrate
the effect of this exception on immunity.
First, a defendant knowingly provides faulty equipment or tack that
causes an injury. The faulty item qualifies as "equipment" or
"tack.""' 3 In this case, the defendant would be exposed to liability
because the injury resulted from the non-inherent risk identified in
the provision for faulty equipment or tack." 4 In the absence of this
provision, the defendant could be liable under other EALA provi-
sions. The defendant, for example, could be liable for willfully or
wantonly disregarding the safety of the participant under section 99E-
2(b)(3), for negligence under section 99E-2(b)(4), or liable under the
products liability laws.' 15
Second, a defendant knowingly provides faulty "equipment" or
"tack" that causes an injury. The faulty item does not qualify as
"equipment" or "tack." In this case, the defendant would not be lia-
ble under section 99E-2(b)(1) for knowingly providing faulty equip-
ment or tack, but could be liable for willfully or wantonly disregarding
the safety of the participant under section 99E-2(b)(3), for negligence
under section 99E-2(b)(4), or under the products liability laws under
section 99E-2(c). Thus, the provision is unnecessary because other
provisions in the EALA limit the defendant's immunity. 6
Third, a defendant unknowingly provides faulty equipment or tack
and has no reason to know that the equipment or tack is faulty. In this
case, a defendant would be immune from liability because the EALA
requires that the defendant know or should have known of the defect.
The defendant would not be exposed to liability for negligence for the
same reason. Finally, the defendant would not be exposed to liability
for willful or wanton disregard for the participant's safety because the
defendant's conduct was not an intentional and unreasonable act that
was done in disregard of a known or obvious risk of such proportion
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(1) (1999).
112. Id.
113. This would have to be determined by the court because the General Assembly did not
provide definitions for "equipment" or "tack."
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(1).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(c) (1999).
116. In the unlikely event that a court determines that intentional acts or omissions are pro-
tected under the EALA, the EALA would grant sponsors immunity where they would otherwise
be liable.
2001]
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that it was highly probable that harm would follow. 117 These hypo-
thetical situations illustrate that the tack and equipment provision is
unnecessary because: 1) the failure to provide safe equipment or tack
exposes the defendant to liability in other, broader non-inherent risk
provisions in the EALA; or 2) the provision provides immunity where
the defendant would not have been liable in the first place.
3. Reasonable and Prudent Efforts to Determine the
Participant's Ability
Inherent risks do not include the failure to make reasonable and
prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to: 1) safely
engage in the activity; or 2) safely manage the equine."18 The General
Assembly's use of "or" between the sponsor's failure to assess the par-
ticipant's abilities is significant. As written, neither failure is depen-
dent on the other. Therefore, a defendant could fail to do one or the
other, and the conduct would fall outside the protection of the
EALA.' 19
What impact does this provision have on the liability of sponsors
under the EALA? The answer depends on other non-inherent risks
identified by the Legislature. A brief return to some hypothetical sit-
uations illustrates the effect of this provision.
First, a sponsor makes reasonable and prudent efforts to determine
the participant's ability to engage in the activity or manage the equine.
The participant is injured. In this case, the sponsor is immune because
117. See infra Part III(A)(5) on the willful and wanton disregard for the safety of the
participant.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(2) (1999).
119. EALAs that have "and" between the defendant's failure to assess the ability of the
participant to safely "engage in the activity" and to "manage the equine" could cause problems
in determining whether both omissions must be present before the conduct falls outside the
scope of inherent risks. Thirty-six EALAs have provisions that limit immunity when defendants
fail to make reasonable efforts to determine a participant's ability. All but four of these EALAs
(Arizona, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Oklahoma) limit immunity when defendants fail to
make reasonable efforts to determine the ability of the participant to safely engage in the activity
and to safely manage the equine. Of the thirty-two EALAs that have both provisions, all but six
(Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina and Ohio) are worded such that immu-
nity is limited only when a sponsor or professional fails to comply with both provisions.
Courts in these states must determine whether their legislatures intended the limitation to
apply when a defendant fails to comply with one or both provisions. In Hendricks v. JAFI, Inc.,
No. 966038, 1999 WL 1336069 (Mass. Super. Jan 20, 1999), a Massachusetts superior court held
that, although the statute as written requires a breach of both duties for an equine professional
to be liable, a professional has a continuing duty to determine whether the participant is able to
safely engage in the activity. Id. at *3. This would prevent an equine professional from escaping
liability by making reasonable efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage in the
activity, then failing to act upon subsequent dangerous behavior during the course of the activity.
Id. at *2. The court held that the proper test is whether the horse's behavior during the activity
would put a reasonable equine professional on notice that the participant does not have the
ability to safely engage in the activity at that time. Id.
13
Blum: Saying Neigh to North Carolina's Equine Activity Liability Act
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2001
SAYING "NEIGH" TO NORTH CAROLINA'S
of the general rule of no liability. However, the EALA does not pro-
tect the sponsor from liability to which the sponsor would be exposed
in the absence of the EALA. The sponsor was not negligent because
the sponsor made reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the
participant's abilities, and the tack and equipment did not fail. Fur-
thermore, the sponsor did not willfully or wantonly disregard the par-
ticipant's safety because the sponsor made reasonable and prudent
efforts to determine the participant's abilities, and the sponsor did not
intentionally refuse to carry out a duty. Finally, the sponsor did not
intentionally injure the participant. In the absence of the EALA, it is
hard to imagine any theories of recovery that would expose the spon-
sor to liability for the participant's injuries. In this case, the non-in-
herent risk provision is unnecessary because the sponsor is exposed to
liability for the same conduct in other sections of the EALA.
Second, a sponsor fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts to
determine the participant's ability to engage in the activity or manage
the equine and the participant is injured. This omission is a specific
example of negligence. Negligence is "the failure to use such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar cir-
cumstances."' 2° The EALA provides that negligence is a non-inher-
ent risk; therefore, the sponsor may be liable for negligence. This
hypothetical situation illustrates that the "abilities" provision is un-
necessary because it is a specific example of negligent conduct that is
addressed in section 99E-2(b)(4) of the EALA.12 1
Third, the sponsor intentionally fails to determine the participant's
ability to engage in the activity or manage the equine. The participant
is injured. In this case, the sponsor may be liable for willful negligence
because the EALA provides that willful and wanton disregard for a
participant's safety is a non-inherent risk.1 22 Thus, the third example
illustrates that the "abilities" provision is unnecessary because it is an
example of willful or wanton conduct, which is addressed in section
99E-2(b)(3).
These hypothetical situations illustrate that the "abilities" provision
is: 1) ineffective because it provides protection where the sponsor
would not have been liable in the first place; or 2) unnecessary be-
cause it is an example of tortious conduct that is specifically addressed
elsewhere in the EALA. This is not the case in states that grant im-
munity to negligent sponsors because the EALA protects sponsors
who would be exposed to liability in the absence of the EALA. How-
120. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (7th ed. 1990).
121. See supra Part III(A)(1) discussing negligence.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(3) (1999).
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ever, in these states, protection may be limited by narrow definitions
of persons covered under the statute.
4. Products Liability
North Carolina and twenty-two other states 123 expressly provide
that EALAs do not limit liability under products liability laws. 124 A
thorough discussion of North Carolina's products liability laws is be-
yond the scope of this paper. 125 However, a brief and general discus-
sion is useful to illustrate the limited scope of immunity offered by
North Carolina's EALA.
Products liability refers to the liability of those who supply products
and goods that are used by purchasers and bystanders for losses
caused by defects in the products. 126 The majority of states recognize
strict liability in tort in products liability actions;1 27 North Carolina,
however, does not.128 Because the North Carolina Products Liability
Act is derivative, the plaintiff must establish a theory of recovery such
as negligence or breach of warranty. 129
To recover from a manufacturer for negligence, a plaintiff must
prove that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer
and that the manufacturer negligently: 1) designed the product; 2)
selected the materials; 3) assembled the product; or 4) inspected the
product. 30 The standard of care for the design and manufacture of a
product is that of a reasonable person under similar circumstances. 3 1
In states that have products liability statutes that impose liability on
manufacturers that fail to adopt safer or more reasonable designs that
would reduce the risk of harm to the consumer without rendering use-
less the product's purpose, a manufacturer may be liable for failing to
123. States with EALAs that do not limit liability under products liability laws are: Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and Washington.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(c) (1999).
125. For an analysis of North Carolina's products liability laws, see CHARLES E. DAYE &
MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 26 (2d ed. 1999).
126. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, 677 (5th
ed. 1984).
127. Id. at 694.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (1999).
129. CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 26.30 (2d
ed. 1999).
130. Cockerham v. Ward, 262 S.E.2d 651 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that plaintiff failed to
prove that manufacturer negligently manufactured, designed, assembled or inspected rubber
straps).
131. Id.
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use safety features such as break-away stirrups on tack and
equipment. 13
2
A seller is not liable for injuries or damages caused by a defective
product if the product arrived from the manufacturer in a sealed
container or if the seller did not have a reasonable opportunity to in-
spect the product. 33 However, the seller may be liable if the plaintiff
proves-in addition to negligence or breach of implied warranty-
that: 1) the seller damaged the product while in the seller's posses-
sion;134 2) the manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
State of North Carolina;135 3) the manufacturer has been judicially
declared insolvent;'36 or 4) the seller fails to warn a foreseeable user
of an unreasonably dangerous condition 3 ' that the seller knew or
should have known posed a substantial risk of harm to a foreseeable
user.
1 38
The products liability provision prevents manufacturers and sellers
from escaping liability under the Products Liability Act by seeking
refuge under the EALA. Thus, the products liability provision at-
tempts to further limit the immunity of sponsors who sell or manufac-
ture equipment or tack used in equine activities. However, even in
the absence of the products liability provision, a seller or manufac-
turer seeking refuge under the EALA would probably not be shielded
from liability because of the negligence provision.
5. Willful and Wanton Disregard for the Safety of a Participant
North Carolina's EALA provides that the willful or wanton disre-
gard for the safety of a participant is not an inherent risk of equine
activities.139 "Willful and wanton" refers to an intentional and unrea-
sonable act or omission by a defendant, done in disregard of a known
or obvious risk of such proportion that it is highly probable that harm
would follow.' 40 The conduct is essentially negligent, rather than in-
tentional.1 41 Because the EALA does not identify intentional tortious
132. Terence J. Centner, The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997, 1020 n.182
(1995).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(a) (1999).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The statute provides an exception for open and obvious risks, or risks that are common
knowledge. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(b) (1999).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5 (1999).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(3) (1999).
140. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, 213 (5th
ed. 1984).
141. Id. at 212-13.
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conduct as a non-inherent risk, 142 the question arises as to whether
"willful or wanton" acts or omissions include intentional torts for the
purposes of the EALA.
Willful, wanton and reckless are often used together. 43 However,
North Carolina courts have attempted to distinguish the three.144
Wanton conduct is an act that manifests a disregard for the rights and
safety of others. 145 Reckless is a synonym for wanton.1 46 Willful neg-
ligence is the "intentional failure to carry out some duty imposed by
law or contract which is necessary to the safety of the person or prop-
erty to which it is owed."'1 47 Unlike an intentional act, a willful breach
of duty may give rise to negligence. 148 Negligence is extinguished only
when the injury is intentional. 149 The willfulness in breaching a duty is
willful negligence, while the willfulness in causing an injury is inten-
tional.' 50 Constructive intent may provide the state of mind needed to
prove an intentional tort.151 Contributory negligence is not a bar to
the plaintiff's recovery.152
As early as 1838, North Carolina's courts have construed statutes as
written, without inquiring into the wisdom of the Legislature. 53 How-
142. Intentional acts were included in the original bill draft's list of acts and omissions that
are not inherent risks. The provision was later removed.
143. The three concepts "[inhabit] a twilight zone which exists somewhere between ordinary
negligence and intentional injury." Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985).
144. Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 248 (N.C. 1985); see also Siders v. Gibbs, 249 S.E.2d
858 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
145. Pleasant, 325 S.E.2d at 248; see also Foster v. Hyman, 148 S.E. 36 (N.C. 1929) (finding
willful and wanton conduct where drunk defendant drove his car on wrong side of road at high
rate of speed at night, struck plaintiffs' car and caused it to collide with telephone pole).
146. Pleasant, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Foster v. Hyman, 148 S.E. 36 (N.C. 1929). In Foster, the Supreme Court stated that
constructive intent to injure exists "where the wrongdoer's conduct is so reckless or so mani-
festly indifferent to the consequences, where the safety of life or limb is involved, as to justify a
finding of willfulness and wantonness equivalent in spirit to an actual intent." Id. at 38.
152. Pearce v. Barham, 156 S.E.2d 290, 294 (N.C. 1967) (quoting Brendle v. R.R., 34 S.E.
634, 635 (N.C. 1899) (plaintiff passenger who was killed in an automobile accident was contribu-
torily negligent in that she should have known that the driver was under the influence of alcohol,
but could nevertheless maintain a negligence action against the driver and owner of the car)).
153. State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838) (upholding Act of 1831, which imposed fines on free
Negroes and persons of color who had been convicted of criminal offenses, and declining to
"supervise" the Legislature's discretion). North Carolina courts have a long history of refusing
to inquire into the wisdom of the Legislature absent a constitutional violation. See Maready v.
City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619 (N.C. 1996) (stating that "[tihe Constitution restricts
powers, and powers not surrendered inhere in the people to be exercised through their repre-
sentatives in the General Assembly; therefore, so long as an act is not forbidden, its wisdom and
expediency are for legislative, not judicial, decision."); Nesbit v. Gill. 41 S.E.2d 646, 653 (N.C.
1947) (finding no constitutional violation and refusing to consider whether the General Assem-
bly acted wisely in granting exemptions to certain buyers and sellers of horses and/or mules).
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ever, a court would probably apply a liberal construction to the
EALA and include intentional tortious conduct in the non-inherent
risk provision for willful and wanton conduct. This would be consis-
tent with the legislative intent to limit sponsor immunity. It is well
established that "where a literal interpretation of the language of a
statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose
of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of
the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disre-
garded." '154 A literal interpretation could expose sponsors to liability
for negligent and willful and wanton acts or omissions, but shield them
from liability for intentional conduct that causes injury, damage or
death. This absurd result was almost certainly not intended by the
Legislature.
The failure to tie a red ribbon around the tail of a horse that kicks
apparently does not rise to the level of willful or wanton disregard for
a participant's safety. Although North Carolina courts have not con-
sidered the issue, the few jurisdictions that have done so have held
that the conduct is not willful or wanton either because the custom is
not widespread 155 or because the custom has not been adopted by a
governing body.156 These jurisdictions have EALAs that include neg-
ligence as an inherent risk. This suggests that plaintiffs injured by
"kickers" had to bring actions for willful and wanton disregard be-
cause the defendants were immune from liability for simple negli-
gence. Thus, it is possible that the failure to tie a red ribbon around
the tail of a kicker is negligent conduct that would expose a defendant
to liability in North Carolina and other jurisdictions that identify neg-
ligence as a non-inherent risk.
B. Failure to Comply with the Warning Requirement
North Carolina's EALA requires sponsors to warn participants that
sponsors are not liable for injuries resulting exclusively from the in-
herent risks of equine activities. 157 Sponsors must post and maintain
154. State v. Barksdale, 107 S.E. 505, 507 (N.C. 1921) (ordering new trial in case of salesper-
son convicted of selling flavoring extracts under statute prohibiting sale of mixtures of any kind
that contained alcohol); see also Frye Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Hunt, 510 S.E.2d 159
(N.C. 1999) (holding that gubernatorial approval process for State Medical Facilities Plans in-
cludes final authority to make substantive amendments to prevent stalemate).
155. Lessman v. Rhodes, 721 N.E. 2d 178, 181 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (finding no evidence of
violation of statute, ordinance, regulation, or safety guideline officially adopted by fox hunting
organizations).
156. Muller v. English, 472 S.E.2d 448, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no evidence that
other sponsors required "kickers" to wear ribbons).
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3(a) (1999). Twenty-six states have EALAs that require warn-
ing signs in various locations. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode
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warning signs in clearly visible locations on or near places of equine
activities.' 58 Sponsors must also include warnings in clearly readable
print in every written contract. 59 The EALA does not appear to im-
pose a duty on sponsors to warn participants; 160 rather, it prevents
sponsors who do not post warnings from claiming immunity.' 6 ' Al-
though the failure to warn participants is not specifically identified as
a non-inherent risk, it has the same effect because sponsors who do
not post warnings fall outside the protection of the EALA.' 62
North Carolina courts might have difficulty determining whether
sponsors have complied with the warning requirement. An examina-
tion of cases in other jurisdictions will be helpful in interpreting North
Carolina's EALA. The Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted the
warning requirement in Amburgey v. Sauder.163  In Amburgey, the
plaintiff was injured when the defendant's horse bit her in the arm.
The plaintiff was at the defendant's stables to watch a friend partici-
pate in a riding lesson. After the lesson, she entered the stables
through a side entrance. The plaintiff was walking down the center
aisle of the barn when another horse lunged over the stall door and bit
her. The Michigan EALA requires sponsors to post warning signs "in
• * . clearly visible location[s] in close proximity to the equine activ-
ity."' 6 4 The defendant had placed warning signs in several locations,
including the front entrance to the facility. However, the warning sign
at the entrance through which the plaintiff entered had been eaten by
a goat prior to the incident.' 65
The court considered whether the defendant complied with the stat-
utory duty to post warning signs by posting one sign at the main en-
trance. The court held that the posting was sufficient, even when the
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Warning signs are optional in Ver-
mont. Only six of these states have provisions stating that the failure to comply with the warning
requirement prevents a sponsor, professional or owner from invoking the privilege of immunity.
These states are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina and South Carolina.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. But see Terence J. Centner, Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkan-
sas: a New Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 ARK. L. REv. 637, 657
n.157 (1998) (EALAs intend to create duty to post warning sign). North Carolina's statutes on
skier safety, which were enacted in 1981, are not ambiguous about whether they create duties.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99C-1 to -5 (1999). The statutes impose duties on skiers, passengers and
operators to act safely. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99C-2 (1999). See Freeman v. Sugar Mountain Re-
sort, Inc., 516 S.E.2d 616 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev'd based on dissenting opinion, 522 S.E.2d 582 (N.C.
1999) (skier sued ski resort after he was injured by another skier who jumped off makeshift
ramp). The violation of any duty constitutes negligence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99C-3 (1999).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-3(c) (1999).
162. See Ford v. Bynum Livestock and Comm'n Co., 674 So. 2d 600 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)
(denying defendant's request for immunity because defendant failed to post warning signs).
163. Amburgey v. Sauder, 605 N.W.2d 84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
164. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1666 (West 2000).
165. Amburgey, 605 N.W.2d at 90.
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participant entered through a different entrance. 166 The applicable
test is whether the defendant made reasonable efforts to comply with
the statute. If so, actual notice is not required under the EALA.167
Requiring the defendant to post a sign at every entrance would "evis-
cerate" immunity.168
In other jurisdictions, substantial compliance is the general rule. In
Muller v. English,'6 9 the plaintiff alleged that the sponsor of a fox hunt
did not comply with the warning requirement in failing to conspicu-
ously post warning signs on the grounds. The Georgia EALA re-
quires that sponsors post signs on or near stables, corrals or arenas
where the sponsor conducts equine activities. 7 ° The defendant
posted five signs in areas where the fox hunt frequently met because
the hunt took place over miles of open country and the path of the fox
could not be pre-determined. She also placed a sign on the windshield
of a vehicle where the hunt started. The court held that substantial
compliance with a statutory requirement was sufficient.1 7 ' North Car-
olina courts may have to resolve similar issues.
The warning requirement is unnecessary if the EALA does not pro-
tect sponsors from civil liability. A defendant who posts warning signs
and includes warnings in contracts may be immune under the EALA,
but not for negligent, intentional, or willful or wanton acts or omis-
sions. However, a defendant who includes the statutory warning in
contracts and includes a broad release clause that extinguishes liability
for negligent acts should escape liability. 172 The defendant in such
cases should raise express assumption of risk, and not the EALA, as a
defense.
C. Strict Liability for Attacks by Dangerous Domestic Animals
North Carolina's EALA is silent as to whether it supercedes com-
mon law strict liability for attacks by dangerous domestic animals.
Thus, the EALA might provide immunity for owners of vicious do-
mestic horses that injure participants. 173 If so, owners of vicious do-
166. Id. at 93.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Muller v. English, 472 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-4(a) (1999).
171. Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 451 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-1(c) (1999)).
172. See B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1998) (holding that summary judg-
ment for defendant proper where plaintiff knowingly signed release, but did not know that re-
lease extinguished liability for any injury); Muller v. English, 472 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment where experienced fox hunter signed re-
lease containing statutory warning and statement that fox hunting was very dangerous).
173. But see Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Discussion of Those
in Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 Ky. L.J. 157, 159 (1995).
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mestic horses may be immune from liability where owners of other
vicious domestic animals would be liable.
Illinois courts have considered this issue. In Carl v. Resnick, t 74 a
horse owned by the defendant kicked the plaintiff and her horse when
the plaintiff met the defendant on a trail. The Illinois Court of Ap-
peals held that the owner could be liable under the Animal Control
Act because the EALA did not apply to parties engaged in recrea-
tional equine activities.175 The Animal Control Act imposes liability
on the owner of an animal that attacks or injures a person without
provocation if the person is lawfully on the premises.' 76 The court
held that the Equine Liability Act bars some actions that would be
permitted by the Animal Control Act, such as those brought by a
plaintiff who is injured while engaged in an equine activity.' 77 How-
ever, in this case, the plaintiff was not engaged in an equine activity.
Michigan courts have also considered this issue. In Amburgey v.
Sauder,1 78 the court examined whether Michigan's EALA permitted
an action against an owner under common law strict liability for inju-
ries caused by dangerous domestic animals. To prove common law
strict liability in Michigan, a plaintiff who has been attacked by an
animal must prove that: 1) the defendant owned the animal; 2) the
animal had dangerous propensities; and 3) the owner knew or should
have known of the dangerous propensities. 179 In Amburgey, the horse
that bit the plaintiff had a tendency to become agitated if disturbed
while eating. The court held that the EALA supersedes common law
strict liability for dangerous domestic animals because the legislature
intended to limit claims against commercial stable operators.18 °
North Carolina, like Michigan, recognizes common law strict liabil-
ity for injuries caused by vicious domestic animals, and could face sim-
ilar claims. The elements needed to establish a prima facie case are
essentially the same as those in Michigan. To prove common law strict
liability in North Carolina, the plaintiff must establish that: 1) the de-
fendant owned or kept the animal; 8 ' 2) the animal had vicious
174. Carl v. Resnick, 714 N.E.2d 1, 5 (I11. App. Ct. 1999), appeal denied, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (I11.
1999).
175. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1 to /999 (West 2000).
176. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16 (West 2000).
177. Carl, 714 N.E.2d at 5. See Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A
Discussion of Those in Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 Ky. L.J. 157, 159 (1995).
178. Amburgey v. Sauder, 605 N.W.2d 84, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). See supra Part Ill(B)
on the failure to comply with the warning requirement.
179. Amburgey, 605 N.W.2d at 93; see also Trager v. Thor, 516 N.W.2d 69 (Mich. 1994) (stat-
ing elements of common law strict liability in action against house sitter as "keeper" of dog that
bit and scratched child).
180. Amburgey, 605 N.W.2d at 93. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to amend her
complaint to include negligence, a theory under which the plaintiff could recover. Id. at 94.
181. Swain v. Tillett, 152 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 1967).
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propensities;' 82 3) the owner knew or should have known of the vi-
cious propensities;' 83 4) the animal injured the plaintiff; and 5) the
injury was a type likely to result from the animal's viciousness. 84 Al-
though the plaintiff does not need to prove negligence,'18 5 the plaintiff
must prove that a reasonable person who knew of the animal's past
conduct would have foreseen that the unrestrained animal would
cause injury or damage.' 86 Thus, the standard of care is that of a rea-
sonable person.'87
If North Carolina follows Michigan in determining that that the
EALA supersedes common law strict liability for domestic horses
with vicious propensities, defendants would be immune under the
EALA where they would otherwise be liable. However, immunity
would be limited to sponsors whose conduct is neither negligent nor
willful or wanton. If North Carolina courts decline to follow Michigan
and determine that attacks by vicious domestic horses are not inher-
ent risks, then sponsors would be exposed to the same liability to
which they would be exposed in the absence of the EALA. Thus, the
EALA would be ineffective in protecting sponsors from civil liability.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The provision that identifies negligence as a non-inherent risk 88
virtually swallows the general rule of immunity for sponsors. The
EALA will shield a sponsor from liability where the sponsor would
otherwise be liable in very few, if any, circumstances. The legislature
could solve this problem by changing the non-inherent risk provision
182. See generally Hill v. Moseley, 17 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. 1941).
183. Swain, 152 S.E.2d at 301. In Swain, the plaintiff broke several bones when her neigh-
bor's pet deer charged and attacked her. The plaintiff had told the neighbor that the deer fre-
quently escaped its pen and chased her in her yard. The court held that the plaintiff did not have
to prove that the owner knew of the deer's vicious propensities. Rather, it was sufficient that the
owner should have known of the animal's vicious propensities. See also Miller v. Snipes, 183
S.E.2d 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that minor who was kicked by pony did not have to
prove owner's actual knowledge of vicious propensities; it was enough that the owner should
have known).
184. Cockerham v. Nixon, 33 N.C. 269, 271 (1850).
185. Lloyd v. Bowen, 86 S.E. 797 (N.C. 1915). In Lloyd, a passer-by was seriously injured
when the defendant's horse knocked him down on a city street. The defendant had left the horse
tied to a tree limb and unattended all day. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial
court did not err in finding the defendant negligent. The plaintiff did not have to prove that the
owner of the horse knew of the horse's vicious propensities in a negligence action. However, the
court held that in cases where the owner was not negligent and the injuries were caused by the
viciousness of the animal, the plaintiff must prove that the owner knew of the animal's vicious-
ness. See also CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS
§§ 19-21 (2d ed. 1999); Charles E. Daye, Judicial Boilerplate Language as Torts Decisional Lit-
any: Four Problem Areas in North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 359 (1996).
186. Sanders v. Davis, 212 S.E.2d 554, 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975).
187. Id.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-2(b)(4) (1999).
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from negligence to gross negligence. The question arises whether this
would fulfill the purpose of the EALA.
If the purpose of the EALA is to protect sponsors from the high
cost of liability insurance, a gross negligence provision would protect
sponsors because there would be, in theory, fewer claims. North Car-
olina's EALA has been in effect for only a few years; therefore, statis-
tics on the number of claims before and after the EALA are not
readily available. Statistics on the cost of liability insurance before
and after the EALA are also not available. If statistics eventually
show that the number of claims was actually low prior to the EALA,
then the justification for the EALA is questionable. In Kentucky,
which has a similar EALA, one equine insurance company that writes
approximately 150 policies per year indicated that it has received only
one claim for equine-related injuries during the last twenty years.' 89 If
the same is true throughout North Carolina, then the number of
claims would not be the root cause of the high cost of liability insur-
ance. Thus, the countermeasure-the EALA-would not address the
real problem.
If, however, statistics eventually show that the unavailability of lia-
bility insurance or the high cost of liability insurance has forced many
sponsors out of business, then the purpose of the EALA seems justi-
fied. In Indiana, one insurance agency indicated that severe and fre-
quent horseback-related injuries caused insurance companies to
refuse coverage for some equine activities. 9 If this is the case in
North Carolina, the question arises whether the EALA, as written,
can achieve the purpose of protecting sponsors from tremendous
expenses.
The answer is most certainly no. The non-inherent risk provision
for negligence eviscerates any meaningful protection purportedly of-
fered by the EALA. The General Assembly would do well to recon-
sider the non-inherent risk provisions. To prevent similar problems in
the future, the General Assembly should also consider guidelines for
enacting dangerous recreational activity statutes. The guidelines
should include provisions for identifying legislative purpose and find-
ings to give courts a better idea how to rule. This would be especially
helpful in light of the ambiguous language of the EALA. Further-
more, the guidelines should identify criteria for granting statutory pro-
tection. This would help legislators determine which recreational
activities need the most protection. Such guidelines would eliminate
189. Letter from Nina Hahn, Nina Hahn Equine Insurance, Inc., to Karen A. Blum, author
(May 30, 2000) (on file with author).
190. E-mail from Evan Beauchamp, Vice President, Equine Insurance Specialists, to Karen
A. Blum, author (May 9, 2000) (on file with author).
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confusing and seemingly random legislation by ensuring "uniform"
protection for persons engaged in the most dangerous or highly liti-
gated recreational activities.
Consider the following problem. In 1997, a bill was introduced into
the House of Representatives that sought to protect llama sponsors
from liability for injuries and damages as a result of llama activities.' 9'
The bill, which was not ratified, was nearly identical to the EALA,
with "llama" substituted for "equine. '"191 At last count, there were
approximately fifty llama farms in North Carolina.1 93 Does North
Carolina need such legislation?1 94 A set of guidelines would help leg-
islators answer this question.
V. CONCLUSION
North Carolina's EALA does not protect sponsors from liability to
which they would be exposed in the absence of the EALA, with the
possible exception of strict liability for attacks by vicious domestic ani-
mals. If the General Assembly wants to protect the 5900 horse opera-
tions in the state,195 then the EALA must be written such that it is
reasonably effective in protecting sponsors. Furthermore, with guide-
lines for enacting dangerous recreational activity statutes, the General
Assembly could effectively target the groups that need the most statu-
tory protection.
KAREN A. BLUMt
191. H. 936-BILL 1, Judiciary 1I Committee, Session 1997 (N.C. 1997) (Llama Activities/Du-
ties and Liability).
192. Id.
193. E-mail from Leanne Lyon, Crystal Coast Llama Farm, to Karen A. Blum, author (June
1, 2000) (on file with author).
194. On a side note, llamas are extremely effective guard animals. One llama can protect up
to 2000 sheep. Although llamas cost more than dogs, they cost less to maintain because llamas
eat the same food and receive the same vaccines as sheep. Llamapaedia, Sheep Guarding, at
http://www.llamapaedia.com/uses/guard.html (last modified June 29, 1997).
195. North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 1996 North Caro-
lina Equine Survey: Equine Inventory and Value by County, at http://www.ncagr.com/stats/
equine/eqinvc.htm (last modified Apr. 25, 1997).
t Karen A. Blum is a 2001 graduate from North Carolina Central School of Law. Most
recently, she assisted Professor Mark W. Morris with the second edition of the North Carolina
Law of Torts hornbook, written by Morris and Professor Charles E. Daye.
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